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STATE v. NOBLES: CHANCE TO SETTLE NEEDLESS
JURISDICTIONAL TURBULENCE
Kaylee Snyder*
I. Introduction
Under the Major Crimes Act (MCA)1, federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over several enumerated criminal offenses that occur in Indian
Country and are committed by “Indians.” When an individual is an enrolled
member of a federally recognized tribe, “Indian” status is easily established
and federal courts hold the authority to prosecute. A jurisdictional issue
arises whenever courts hear cases involving individuals that fall slightly
outside specified membership requirements. Although such individuals are
not qualified for tribal membership, many tribal courts exercise jurisdiction
over them, still considering them to be “Indian” under the MCA.
Additionally, some tribes recognize “Indian” status by extending benefits to
these non-members because they are close descendants of enrolled
members.
Courts have long searched for the most suitable and consistent way to
define “Indian” under the MCA to settle jurisdictional battles between
states and the federal government. The United States Supreme Court has
not specified the appropriate way to reach that definition, and it declined to
rule on the issue once again after a petition for writ was filed in State v.
Nobles, a case arising out of the North Carolina Supreme Court.2
Part I of this Note serves to introduce the issues surrounding the lack of a
clear definition of the word “Indians” in the MCA. Part II will examine the
background leading up to the current circuit split regarding this subject
matter. Part III specifies the particulars of that circuit split. Part IV breaks
down North Carolina’s case of first impression regarding this issue. Part V
discusses the writ petition that defendant George Nobles filed in his case.
Finally, Part VI argues, consistent with the writ petition, that the federal
jurisprudence on this issue is needlessly convoluted. The correct and most
effective entity to decide whether an individual is considered “Indian”
under the MCA is the respective tribe itself.

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Otherwise known as the Indian Major Crimes Act (MCA).
2. 838 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 2020).
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II. Background Leading to the Major Crimes Act (MCA)
and the Court’s Attempt to Define “Indian”
The second section of this Note offers a brief explanation of the events
that ultimately produced the circuit split surrounding the issue of
determining Indian status under the MCA.
A. Enactment of the MCA
In 1854, the Indian Country Crimes Act (ICCA) extended the general
criminal laws of the United States to crimes committed in Indian Country.3
However, this extension had three exceptions: (1) offenses committed by
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian; (2) offenses
committed by an Indian in Indian Country against anyone, if the perpetrator
of that offense has already been punished by the local law of the tribe; and
(3) any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be reserved to the Indian tribe.4 In 1883, the
Supreme Court held, in accordance with the ICCA, that federal courts did
not have jurisdiction over crimes committed by one Indian against another
Indian in Indian country.5
In response to this decision, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act
(MCA) in 1885.6 The MCA extended federal jurisdiction over “any Indian”
who committed any of the listed major crimes in the statute “against the
person or property of another Indian or other person.”7 The MCA did not
define the term “Indian,” leaving courts to interpret its meaning.
B. United States v. Rogers
The test for determining who qualifies as an Indian for the purposes of
the ICCA and the MCA originated in an 1845 Supreme Court decision—
United States v. Rogers8—and remains controlling today. In this case,
William Rogers, a white man, was charged with murdering another white
man on land belonging to the Cherokee Tribe.9 Rogers claimed that, despite
being white men, he and his victim had essentially been adopted into the
Tribe, were recognized as Indians by the Tribe, and both exercised all the
3. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country,
10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49, 51 (2017).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
5. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
7. Id.
8. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1845).
9. Id. at 571.
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rights and privileges of Cherokee Indians.10 Thus, Rogers asserted that the
court did not have jurisdiction over his case.11
The predecessor statute to the ICCA withheld federal jurisdiction over
crimes committed by one Indian against another Indian.12 In interpreting
this statute, the Supreme Court reasoned that “the exception is confined to
those who by the usages and customs of the Indians are regarded as
belonging to their race.”13 Rogers was not an Indian solely because of his
political affiliation to the Tribe, therefore enumerating the ancestral
requirement for Indian status.14
Lower courts interpreted Rogers as creating a two-pronged test for
determining whether a person is an Indian under the MCA.15 Pursuant to
this test, an “Indian” must: (1) have some quantum of Indian blood; and (2)
be recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government. 16 Because
the first prong merely requires “some” Indian blood, “evidence of a parent,
grandparent, or great-grandparent who is clearly identified as an Indian is
generally sufficient to satisfy this prong.”17 The tribal or federal recognition
prong “probes whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link
to a formerly sovereign people.”18
III. The Current Circuit Split
The first prong of the Rogers test is typically determined with ease,
seeing that it only requires a finding that a defendant has some quantum of
Indian blood. Thus, the circuit split primarily lies within the second prong
of the Rogers test: whether a defendant has obtained tribal recognition as an
Indian. Lower courts approach recognition by a tribal entity in three
different ways—by directly asking whether a specific tribe recognizes the
defendant as Indian, by using a four-factor analysis, and lastly through a
more wholistic approach that examines those four factors, as well as any
other aspects the court finds relevant.

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 92 Stat. 729, 733.
13. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Zepeda, 729 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015).
16. See, e.g., Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 762; Zepeda, 729 F.3d at 1113.
17. United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005).
18. Id. at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456 (D.S.D. 1988)).
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A. Approach One
The first approach is to simply ask whether the respective tribe
recognizes the defendant as Indian for purposes of their own criminal
jurisdiction or in other respects such as offering benefits to certain nonmember descendants.19 The Seventh Circuit, the Utah Supreme Court, and a
dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit utilize this method.20 For example, in
United States v. Cruz, the defendant was classified as a “descendant.”21
This classification gave the defendant access to certain tribal benefits
“including medical treatment at any Indian Health Service facility in the
United States, certain educational grants, housing assistance and hunting
and fishing privileges on the reservation.”22 For the dissenting Chief Judge
Kozinski, the mere fact that the Tribe categorized the defendant as a
“descendant” and extended those benefits to him because of that status was
enough to establish tribal recognition required by the second prong of
Rogers.23 Ultimately, this method defers to the tribal entities’ determination
of tribal recognition.
B. Approach Two
The second enumerated approach courts apply in determining the second
prong of the Rogers test uses a four-factor analysis in which the factors are
considered in declining order of significance. The test arises out of St.
Cloud v. United States, a decision handed down by the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota, which considers: “1)
19. For example, in the Nobles case covered in this Note, defendant Nobles’ mother is
an enrolled member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), which makes Nobles
what the tribe considers a “first descendant.” State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 375 (N.C.
2020). While first descendants are not entitled to all benefits that enrolled members are, the
EBCI extends certain benefits to them. Id. at 376. For the purposes of the first method, this
would be the EBIC “recognizing” Nobles as an Indian because they are extending benefits
from their tribe to him due to his status as a first descendant. Id.
20. See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the test
was simply “tribal or governmental recognition as an Indian,” not delving into any list of
factors that would establish that recognition); see also State v. Perenk, 858 P.2d 927, 933
(Utah 1993) (finding that defendant being formally recognized by the tribe as an Indian was
enough to satisfy the second prong of Rogers test, not stating any additional factors
considered); United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of a four-factor test as overly convoluted and not
supported by Rogers).
21. 554 F.3d at 840.
22. Id. at 852.
23. Id.
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enrollment in a tribe; 2) government recognition formally and informally
through providing the person assistance reserved only to Indians; 3)
enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian
through living on a reservation and participating in Indian social life.”24
Several cases in the Ninth Circuit have utilized this method through a
process by which they consider numerous factual findings that help them
weigh the factors and ultimately determine whether a defendant is
recognized as an Indian.25
C. Approach Three
The final method considers the St. Cloud factors non-exhaustively and in
no order of importance, virtually using the four-factor test as a starting
point for determining recognition by a tribal entity.26 Various courts,
including the Eighth Circuit,27 the Idaho Supreme Court,28 and North
Carolina Supreme Court,29 utilize this method for determining the second
prong of the Rogers test. This approach considers any possible factors that
the court finds relevant in determining Indian status.30
IV. Nobles v. North Carolina
On February 28, 2020, the Supreme Court of North Carolina filed its
first-ever opinion addressing the determination of Indian status under the
MCA.31 Aside from Indian status determination, the Court also decided
whether that designation should be a question for the judge or the jury32 The
Court used the third approach to determining Indian status mentioned above
to conclude that the defendant did not satisfy the “recognition prong” of the
Rogers test, and opined that Indian status was to be decided by a jury, rather
than the judge.

24. 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988).
25. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Zepeda, 729 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015).
26. See United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009); see also State v.
George, 422 P.3d 1142, 1146 (Idaho 2018); State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 380 (N.C.
2020).
27. Stymiest, 581 at 764.
28. George, 422 P.3d at 1146.
29. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 380.
30. Id. at 382 (also considering whether the defendant had been subjected to civil or
criminal tribal jurisdiction in the past).
31. Id. at 373.
32. Id. at 377.
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A. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 30, 2012, Barbara Preidt was robbed and fatally shot
outside of a hotel in Jackson County, North Carolina.33 The crime occurred
“within the Qualla Boundary—land [] held in trust by the United States for
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI).”34 As a result, the Cherokee
Indian Police arrested the defendant, George Lee Nobles, and two others for
the crime.35 Because Nobles’ co-defendants were enrolled members of the
Cherokee Nation, “they were brought before an EBCI tribal magistrate for
indictment proceedings.”36 However, because Nobles was not an enrolled
member of the EBCI, he was brought before a county magistrate and
charged in Jackson County with “first-degree murder, robbery with a
dangerous weapon, and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon.”37
Nobles moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction, arguing he
was an Indian pursuant to the MCA and thus could not be tried in state
court.38 At the trial court’s pre-trial hearing on Nobles’ motion, the parties
stipulated that, since Nobles’ mother was an enrolled member of the EBCI,
Nobles would be considered a first descendant of the Tribe.39 Testimony
offered at the hearing indicated that, while first descendants do not receive
the full range of benefits that enrolled members enjoy, they are eligible for
some benefits that persons not affiliated with the Tribe are not.40 These
benefits pertain to property, health care, employment, and education.41
The trial court heard a multitude of testimonies that aided in its ruling on
the motion. Significantly, testimony revealed that, in a pre-sentence report
for prison time Nobles served from 1993 to 2011, his race was listed as
“white.”42 When Nobles was released from that prison stint, he listed his
race as “white” on an Application for Interstate Compact Transfer.43
Nobles’ probation officers testified that, after he was released in 2011, he
lived at various addresses on or near the Qualla Boundary up until his arrest

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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in the current case.44 The probation officers also testified that Nobles never
presented to them that he was an Indian.45
Nobles’ mother testified that, as a child, Nobles attended both Cherokee
tribal school and county public school.46 On one Bureau of Indian Affairs
enrollment application, Nobles’ mother listed his “Degree Indian” as
“none” and on another enrollment application she listed his tribal affiliation
as “Cherokee.”47 Additional testimony was heard regarding Nobles’ health
care history.48 This testimony uncovered that, as a child, portions of
Nobles’ medical bills for treatment at a county hospital were covered by the
Tribe.49 Nobles received care at the Cherokee Indian Hospital on five
occasions as a minor.50
The trial court ultimately denied Nobles’ motion to dismiss, finding he
was not an Indian within the meaning of the MCA.51 Nobles then filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to the North Carolina Supreme Court seeking
review of the trial court’s order, but his writ was denied.52 In 2016, Nobles
“renewed his motion to dismiss . . . in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction
and, in the alternative, moved that the [] issue relating to his Indian status
[should] be submitted to the jury[.53] The trial court denied both motions.”54
Nobles was subsequently tried for the crimes, convicted, and sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.55 He appealed his
conviction to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which ultimately held
that he was not an Indian under the MCA and that the question of that status
was not one for the jury.56 Nobles filed a petition for discretionary review
with the North Carolina Supreme Court in 2018.57 The court accepted
Nobles’ petition and rendered a decision in 2020.58

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Holding and Reasoning
The North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether Nobles was
classified as an Indian under the MCA and whether that determination
should be presented to a jury.59 The court held that Nobles did not qualify
for Indian status under the MCA.60 It additionally held that this
determination was reserved solely for a judge rather than a jury.61
1. Denial of Nobles’ Motion to Dismiss
The court stated that there was no dispute as to the fact that the crime at
issue took place in “Indian Country,” nor was there a dispute that the
charges against Nobles constituted major crimes under the MCA.62 Instead,
the dispute before the court was whether Nobles qualified for Indian status
under the Act.63 The court reasoned that, since the term “Indian” was not
defined by the MCA, its reliance would need to fall on Rogers’ twopronged test.64 The court noted that the first prong—whether a given
individual has some Indian blood—was not at issue because both parties
agreed that Nobles possessed an Indian blood quantum of 4.29%.65
Therefore, only the second prong—whether the given tribe or the federal
government recognizes the individual as an Indian—was up for
consideration.66
The court relied on other courts’ analyses on this issue since Nobles’
case was one of first impression in North Carolina.67 It then noted that the
majority of tribunals utilize the four-factor balancing test first articulated in
St. Cloud.68 The factors include: “1) enrollment in a tribe; 2) government
recognition formally and informally through providing the person
assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoying benefits of tribal affiliation;
and 4) social recognition as an Indian through living on a reservation and
participating in Indian social life.”69

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377–78.
Id. (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988)).
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The court explained the current split regarding the application of the St.
Cloud factors; some courts view the factors as exclusive and in descending
order of significance while others hold that the factors should not be viewed
as exhaustive nor tied to any order of importance.70 The Nobles court then
adopted the latter application, citing the “needed flexibility for courts in
determining the inherently imprecise issue of whether an individual should
be considered to be Indian.”71 Further, “relevant factors may exist beyond
the four St. Cloud factors that bear on this issue.”72
Before applying the St. Cloud factors, the court addressed Nobles’
threshold argument that applying the factors was unnecessary because his
first-descendant status irrefutably demonstrated tribal recognition under the
second prong of Rogers.73 The court rejected this argument and cited its
concern that “such an approach would reduce the Rogers test into a purely
blood-based inquiry, thereby conflating the two prongs of the Rogers test
into one.”74 Accepting Nobles’ argument would “defeat the purpose of the
test, which is to ascertain not just a defendant’s blood quotient, but also his
social, societal, and spiritual ties to a tribe.”75
Moreover, the court was not persuaded by Nobles’ argument that the
North Carolina Supreme Court was bound by the decision of the Cherokee
Court in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert on this matter.76 The
issue in Lambert was whether the defendant was an Indian for the purposes
of EBCI tribal criminal jurisdiction.77 Though not an enrolled member of
the Tribe, the Lambert defendant was recognized as a first descendant.78
The Cherokee Court rejected the Lambert defendant’s argument that lack
of enrollment was dispositive of her Indian status, explaining that
membership in a tribe is not a crucial factor in the test for determining
whether a person is Indian for the purpose of criminal jurisdiction.79
Instead, the Lambert court relied on the Rogers test and the St. Cloud
factors, citing the benefits available to EBCI first descendants.80 The court
70. Id. at 378.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 378–79.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 379.
76. Id. (citing E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. 62 (N.C. Cherokee
Tribal Ct. 2003)).
77. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 62).
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 64).
80. Id.
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in Lambert ruled the defendant met the definition of an Indian because she
availed herself to the civil jurisdiction of the Cherokee Court under a
pending lawsuit against a tribal member and because first descendants are
participating members of the tribal community and treated as such by the
Tribe.81
The Court rejected Nobles’ reliance on Lambert for a variety of reasons.
First, the court noted that it was “far from clear that the Lambert court
intended to announce a categorial rule that all first descendants must be
classified as Indians.”82 If first-descendant classification was itself enough
to suffice Indian status, the court would not have sought additional evidence
to make its determination of whether the defendant was subject to its
jurisdiction.83
Secondly, the Nobles court concluded that, even if the Cherokee Court
did intend to make such a categorial rule, the North Carolina Supreme
Court was not bound by it.84 The court noted that the Supreme Court of the
EBCI has clarified that it does not consider Cherokee Court opinions “as
having any precedential value since the Cherokee Court is the trial court for
[the Cherokee Supreme Court].”85
Lastly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected Nobles’ reliance on
Lambert on precedential and jurisdictional grounds.86 A prior exercise of
jurisdiction by a tribal court “is not dispositive on the issue of whether a
state court possesses jurisdiction over such defendant in a particular case.”87
a) Applying the St. Cloud Factors
Having rejected Nobles’ initial arguments, the court applied the four St.
Cloud factors. It also decided that it would consider any other relevant
factors, if any were raised by Nobles, in making this determination. As for
the first St. Cloud factor, enrollment in a tribe, it was an undisputed fact that
Nobles was not an enrolled member of any federally recognized tribe.88
Therefore, that element was easily settled.

81. Id. (citing Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. at 65).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 379–80.
85. Id. at 380 (quoting Teesateskie v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians Minors Fund, 13
Am. Tribal Law 180, 188 (E. Cher. Sup. Ct. 2015)).
86. Id.
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id.
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The second St. Cloud factor, government recognition through provision
of any assistance, required the Nobles court to decide whether Nobles was
the “recipient of ‘government recognition formally and informally through
receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians.’”89 The court pointed out that
Nobles failed to satisfy this factor solely by offering a list of benefits
available to descendants.90 It opined that this factor of the St. Cloud test is
concerned with the tribal benefits a defendant has actually received and not
just benefits for which that individual is eligible.91 The court made notice of
the benefits that Nobles actually received, which consisted of five
occurrences of free medical care that he acquired as a minor at the
Cherokee Indian Hospital.92
In analyzing the third factor, enjoyment of benefits of tribal affiliation,
the court had to determine whether Nobles “received any broader benefits
from his affiliation with a tribe—apart from the receipt of government
assistance.”93 The court referred to the trial court’s showing that, aside from
the fact that Nobles lived on or near the Qualla Boundary for the fourteen
months leading up to the murder, as well as his partial attendance in the
Cherokee tribal school system as a child, he enjoyed no other benefits of
tribal affiliation.94
For the fourth and final St. Cloud factor, social recognition as an Indian,
the court considered “whether [Nobles] received ‘social recognition as an
Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian social
life.’”95 The court pointed to various relevant factors that other courts
consider, such as whether the individual speaks a tribal language, lives on
the reservation, attends school on the reservation, socializes with other
Indians, and participates in tribal rituals.96 Other courts have found that this
fourth factor weighs against defendants “who have never been involved in
Indian cultural, community, or religious events; never participated in tribal
politics; and have not placed any emphasis on their Indian heritage.”97
Nobles lived on or near the Qualla Boundary for about fourteen months,
had a girlfriend who was an enrolled tribal member, and had two tattoos
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. (quoting United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 381.
Id. (quoting United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005)).
Id.
Id.
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purporting to demonstrate celebration of his Indian heritage.98 Despite these
facts, the court emphasized that the trial court revealed no findings that
Nobles ever attended any cultural, community, or religious activities; that
he spoke the tribal language; that he possessed a tribal ID; or that he
partook in tribal politics.99 Additionally, an active elder of the EBCI Tribe
testified she had never seen Nobles at any EBCI events and on several
documents Nobles identified himself as “white.”100
(5) Other Relevant Factors
Since the court determined that it would analyze the factors nonexclusively and in no order of importance, it kept open the possibility that
Nobles could point to other relevant factors that may play a role in
examining the second prong of the Rogers test.101 The court noted that
several other courts consider the additional relevant fact of whether an
individual was ever subject to tribal jurisdiction in the past.102 Nobles,
however, had never been subject to any tribal jurisdiction in the past, nor
did he point the court to any additional factors that would be relevant under
the second prong of the Rogers test.103
After analyzing all relevant factors under the Rogers test, the court
concluded that Nobles was not an Indian for purposes of the MCA.104
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Nobles’ motion to
dismiss.105
2. Special Jury Verdict
Next, the court moved to address Nobles’ second claim that the
determination of his Indian status should have been presented to the jury
rather than the judge.106 Nobles cited two of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s decisions in support of this contention: State v. Batdorf107 and
State v. Rick.108

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id.
Id.
238 S.E.2d 497 (N.C. 1977)).
463 S.E.2d 182 (N.C. 1995)).
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The Nobles court recounted that, in Batdorf, the defendant challenged the
trial court’s territorial jurisdiction and cited that there was “insufficient
evidence that his crime was committed in North Carolina . . . ‘so as to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of [North Carolina].’”109 In deciding
Batdorf, the North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that the trial court
“should have instructed the jury to ‘return a verdict indicating lack of
jurisdiction’ if the jury was not satisfied that the crime occurred in North
Carolina.”110
Similarly, in State v. Rick, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted that
the defendant challenged the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction, contending
that the State did not adequately prove whether the crime took place in
North Carolina.111 Citing Batdorf, the Rick court held that the question of
jurisdiction should have been submitted to the jury.112
In Nobles, the court rejected Nobles’ reliance on Batdorf and Rick;
unlike Nobles’ case, the issue in Batdorf and Rick was the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.113 The Nobles court pointed out that Nobles was “making an
entirely separate argument that he was required to be prosecuted in federal
court pursuant to the MCA.”114 Therefore, since Nobles’ claim was not a
territorial jurisdiction challenge, the court’s decisions in Batdorf and Rick
did not apply.115
To the Nobles court, the absence of any factual dispute relevant to the
MCA analysis made it senseless to hold that a jury was required to
determine a “purely legal jurisdictional issue . . . .”116 The court illustrated
this principle in State v. Darroch.117 The Darroch defendant, a Virginia
resident, hired two people to kill her husband.118 The defendant’s husband
was killed in North Carolina by the hitmen.119 On appeal, the defendant
argued the North Carolina trial court lacked jurisdiction considering the
murder took place in North Carolina but was arranged in another state.120
109. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 502).
110. Id. (quoting Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 503).
111. Id. (citing Rick, 463 S.E.2d at 186).
112. Rick, 463 S.E.2d at 186 (citing Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d at 503).
113. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 382.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 383.
117. 287 S.E.2d 856 (N.C. 1982).
118. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 383 (citing Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 857) (discussing the North
Carolina’s Supreme Court decision in Darroch).
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 859–60).
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The Darroch defendant cited Batdorf and contended that, because she
raised a jurisdictional issue, it was a question of fact for the jury.121 The
Darroch court rejected this argument, explaining that Batdorf is only
applicable when the facts on which the State bases its jurisdiction are in
dispute.122 The Darroch defendant was challenging the legal theory of
jurisdiction rather than raising any disputes in the facts that the State argued
supported jurisdiction.123
The Nobles court concluded that, as in Darroch, Nobles did not
challenge the underlying facts on which the State based its jurisdiction;
rather, Nobles challenged the trial court’s determination that the MCA was
not applicable to his case.124 The court ultimately opined that Nobles’
challenge was an “inherently legal question properly decided by the trial
court rather than by the jury.”125
3. Justice Earls’ Dissent
The lone dissenter, Justice Anita Earls, believed Nobles was entitled to a
special jury verdict on the issue of his “Indian” status.126 Justice Earls
asserted that, if the majority was correct in concluding that the question was
not meant for a jury, she disagreed with its conclusion that Nobles was not
an Indian under the MCA.127
a) Special Jury Verdict
In her dissent, Earls first attacked the majority’s argument that its
decisions in Batdorf and Rick were not applicable to Nobles’ case.128 As a
reminder, the Nobles court rejected Nobles’ reliance on these cases because
the challenges there were to the court’s territorial jurisdiction and, here,
Nobles challenged the State’s ability to prosecute him pursuant to the
MCA.129 Earls argued that, regardless of this distinction, Nobles, “like the
defendants in Batdorf and Rick, ‘[was] contesting the very power of [the]
State to try him.’”130 Earls reminded the court that contesting this
jurisdictional power was determined in Batdorf to be an issue presented for
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. (citing Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 866).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Darroch, 287 S.E.2d at 866).
Id.
Id. at 383–84 (Earls, J., dissenting).
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id. (quoting State v. Batdorf, 238 S.E.2d 497, 502 (N.C. 1977)).
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a jury’s determination; thus, it should be determined by a jury here in this
case.131 Earls then pointed out that, instead of explaining what made the
challenge to territorial jurisdiction different from a jurisdictional challenge
under the MCA, the majority erroneously alleged that the issue of Nobles’
Indian status was a “purely legal” issue that should not be decided by a
jury.132 Absent any explanation of these differences by the majority, Earls’
dissent asserted that the issue of Indian status under the MCA “involves
fundamental questions of fact,” making it a factual dispute for the jury
alone.133
The dissent acknowledged that this factual determination would not be
an easy one for a jury; the issue “quickly devolves into a multifaceted
inquiry requiring examination into factual areas not normally considered”
by the courts, and “involves difficult questions of race, including the extent
to which a defendant self-identifies as an Indian . . . .”134 Earls opined that,
regardless of this difficulty, the determination was still factual, rendering it
only suitable to be decided by a jury.135 In light of this “inherently factual
inquiry,” as well as the court’s precedent in Batdorf and Rick that
jurisdictional challenges are meant for jury determination, Earls
respectfully opined that the issue should be submitted to a jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.136
b) Denial of Nobles’ Motion to Dismiss
For hypothetical purposes, Earls conceded that Nobles was not entitled
to a special jury verdict.137 But in light of this fact, Earls still would have
concluded that the defendant was an Indian under the MCA.138
First, Earls addressed the majority’s interpretation of Lambert. The
majority’s interpretation was this: because the parties stipulated as to
Lambert’s status as an EBCI first descendant but still conducted a further
evidentiary hearing to make the determination of her Indian status, the
logical inference was that first-descendant status alone was not enough to
determine the issue.139 Earls explained that, because the tribal court had not
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 395–86.
134. Id. at 387.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, 3 Cher. Rep. 62 (N.C. Cherokee
Tribal Ct. 2003)).
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previously addressed the issue of Indian status of a non-member, the correct
logical inference is that the court needed additional evidence only because
the issue was one of first impression.140
To Earls, this logical inference was particularly apparent given that
nearly all factual findings from the tribal court addressed first descendants
generally.141 Earls declared that Lambert “plainly ruled that first
descendants are Indians.”142 She explained that this interpretation was
further fostered by the tribal court’s subsequent ruling that same year in In
re Welch, 3 Cher. Rep. 71 (N.C. Cherokee Ct. 2003), which relied on its
conclusion in Lambert that first descendants were Indians for the purpose of
criminal jurisdiction of the court.143 Earls specifically emphasized the
Lambert court’s statement that “when a tribal magistrate conducts the St.
Cloud test, if a defendant is a First Descendant, ‘the inquiry ends there and
the Court has jurisdiction over the defendant.’”144
Second, the dissent points out that, in examining the second prong of the
Rogers test and applying the St. Cloud factors, the majority failed to
recognize the significance of the fact that Nobles was incarcerated for
nearly twenty years.145 Justice Earls reminds the court the importance this
fact holds when examining Nobles’ ability to receive assistance and
benefits due to tribal affiliation.146 Moreover, Nobles’ extended
incarceration is significant when considering other parts of the St. Cloud
factors, such as if Nobles participated in tribal politics.147
In sum, Justice Earls focused on previous tribal court decisions and the
Cherokee Rules of Criminal Procedure to conclude that first defendants
were considered Indians under Rogers and the MCA. She additionally
measured the St. Cloud factors while keeping in mind that Nobles spent a
large portion of his life incarcerated. In doing all this, Earls would have
determined that Nobles had been recognized by a tribe and as an Indian
under the MCA.148

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 388.
143. Id. at 388–89.
144. Id. at 389 (quoting CHER. R. CRIM. PROC. 6(b)(1), Cherokee RCRP Rule 6
(Westlaw)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 389–90.
148. Id. at 390.
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V. Nobles’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari
After the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
decision, Nobles petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review his
case on July 27, 2020.149 The writ petition, specifically asked the Court to
answer the following questions: (1) “How does one determine whether a
defendant is an Indian?” and (2) “Is Indian status a jury question?”150 On
October 5, 2020, the Supreme Court declined to review the petition.151
A. Reasons to Grant the Petition
Nobles’ petition gave two main reasons as to why the Court should grant
his writ petition. First, Nobles cited the practical problem of not having a
delineated way for courts to determine Indian status.152 Nobles offered that
“a person who is an Indian in some jurisdictions (and who is thus triable
only in the federal courts) is not an Indian in other jurisdictions (and is thus
triable only in the state courts).”153 Second, pertaining to the question of
whether Indian status is a jury question, was Nobles’ concern that the North
Carolina Supreme Court veered from the conventional manner in which all
other courts have considered the question, each finding that whether a
defendant is an Indian is a factual question for the jury.154 Thus, Nobles
pled that both questions demanded an answer from the Court to settle the
jurisdictional tussle.155
1. The Court Should Decide How to Determine Indian Status Under the
MCA
Nobles’ writ petition pointed to the legal silence that ultimately created
this issue.156 First to blame is the lack of any definition for the word
“Indian” in the Major Crimes Act, mandating exclusive jurisdiction over
Indians who commit certain crimes within Indian Country.157 Without any

149. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Nobles v. State, 838 S.E.2d 373 (N.C. 2020) (No.
20-87), 2020 WL 4369698 [hereinafter Writ Petition].
150. Id. at i.
151. 141 S. Ct. 365 (2020).
152. Writ Petition, supra note 149, at 12.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 13.
156. Id. at 14.
157. Id.
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statutory guidance to define “Indian,” Nobles stated that lower courts are
forced to rely on the guidance provided by Rogers.158
Nobles elucidated that Rogers has been interpreted to mean that a
defendant is an Indian under the MCA “if (1) he is of Indian decent (often
crudely described as having some ‘Indian blood’), and (2) he is recognized
as an Indian by either the federal government or a federally-recognized
tribe.”159 Nobles further explained that the lower courts are in agreement on
two things regarding the two-pronged test enumerated in Rogers: first, that
no specific percentage of Indian blood is required to satisfy the first prong
and, second, that one can be considered Indian without being an enrolled
member of a recognized tribe.160 Beyond these two clarifications, Nobles
stated, the lower courts haven’t agreed on much more.161
a) Three Methods Used by Lower Courts
In this section of his writ petition, Nobles described the three differing
approaches in determining the second prong of the Rogers test used by the
lower courts, mentioned previously in greater detail in Part III of this
Note.162 To briefly review, these three methods are: (1) simply asking
whether the tribe recognizes the defendant as an Indian for the purposes of
their own jurisdiction; (2) applying a four-factor test, in which the factors
are considered in declining order of importance; and (3) considering all
potential relevant factors in addition to the four-factor test in no order of
importance.163
b) The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s Decision Was Wrong
After laying out the current split for the Court, Nobles explained why the
method the North Carolina Supreme Court followed was both wrong and
unworkable. This portion of Nobles’ writ petition was used to defend the
first specified method, which asks the tribe if it recognizes a certain
defendant as an Indian.
First, Nobles made the claim that the multi-factor test used in method
three by many courts, and now the North Carolina Supreme Court, is “no
way to make threshold decisions about which court system has jurisdiction

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1845)).
Id. (citation omitted).f
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
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to try a defendant.”164 According to Nobles, complicated tests like these
waste time and money, focusing not on the merits of the case but on the
issue of jurisdiction.165 Nobles then demonstrated to the Court that, in this
case alone, the trial court heard twelve different witnesses, examined
school, medical, employment, and probation records, and became versed in
many aspects of the Cherokee tribal government, “including the health care
and education it provides, the property rights it administers, and its system
of voting.”166 All of these considerations ultimately led to 278 numbered
findings of fact aiding in the jurisdictional determination before even
touching the actual case at bar.167 To Nobles, bright lines are much more
efficient than a test that considers potentially endless amounts of facts to
determine which court takes the reins.168
Nobles then outlined why, rather than using either the multi-factor test or
the four-factor test other courts employ, simply asking whether the
defendant is recognized as an Indian by the tribe is the most efficient way
of determining Indian status for jurisdictional purposes.169 Nobles pointed
out that tribes already make this determination when they exercise their
own jurisdiction because their jurisdiction extends generally to “Indians”
and not exclusively enrolled tribal members.170 Additionally, “[j]ust as
tribes have the right to define their own membership, they have the right to
define whom they will recognize as ‘Indian’ for criminal jurisdiction
purposes.”171 From this, Nobles argued that “tribes are certainly in a better
position to make this determination than state or federal judges are.”172
Nobles bolstered his argument in favor of consulting directly with a
given tribe by arguing that it is consistent with the intent of Congress at the
time the MCA was enacted in 1885.173 The controlling definition of
“Indian,” for jurisdictional purposes, at the time of the MCA’s enactment
came from the Court’s holding in Rogers, which was “extremely simple and
included no ‘factors’ for the courts to balance.”174 The Court in Rogers held

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Writ Petition, supra note 149, at 21.
Id. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
Writ Petition, supra note 149, at 22.
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that an Indian was a person “whom Indians themselves ‘regarded as
belonging to their race.’”175
Retaining Rogers’ deference to the tribes is also consistent with both the
actual text and purpose of the MCA. Here, Nobles reminded the Court that
the MCA was enacted in direct response to Ex parte Crow Dog,176 a case in
which the Court ruled that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an Indianon-Indian murder occurring in Indian Country.177 When enacting the MCA,
Congress “used a phrase virtually identical to the [statute] the Court had
interpreted in Rogers.”178 The statute being interpreted in Rogers referred to
“crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian,” whereas the subsequent original wording in the MCA was “all
Indians, committing against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following crimes.”179 Nobles argued that, “[b]y
using language with an established meaning in the statute, Congress
signaled its intent to retain that meaning.”180
To show how retaining this deference to the tribes is consistent with the
purpose of the MCA, Nobles reminded the Court of its reason for upholding
the constitutionality of the MCA: the federal government owes a “duty of
protection” to tribes from being mistreated in state court systems. 181 For this
reason, “it would have made no sense to let the state courts decide who is
an ‘Indian.’”182
Additionally, Nobles offered the fact that the statute the Court was
interpreting in Rogers still exists today, rarely amended, as the Indian
Country Crimes Act, with Section 1152 proscribing intra-Indian crime.183
Nobles presumes that the term “Indian” holds the same meaning in both the
ICCA and the MCA; otherwise “it would be possible for federal law to
proscribe an offense under [a section of the Indian Country Crimes Act] but
for federal courts to lack jurisdiction to try that offense under [the
MCA].”184 The definition of “Indian” under section 1152 of the Indian

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1845)).
109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Writ Petition, supra note 149, at 23.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572 and 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885)).
Id.
Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Country Crimes Act must then hold the same definition as “Indian” in
Rogers, meaning someone whom the tribes themselves regard as Indian.185
Turning toward the instant case, Nobles argued his case was a good
demonstration of Congress’s intent to defer to the tribe’s determination of
whether a person is an Indian.186 Nobles posited that the trial court could
have simply “consulted Rule 6(b) of the Cherokee Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . which showed that the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
classified First Descendants as Indians for criminal jurisdictional
purposes.”187 Instead, the trial court engaged in what Nobles argued was a
needless, lengthy factual determination to ascertain whether he was
recognized by the Tribe as an Indian.188
Finally, Nobles claimed that the North Carolina Supreme Court grossly
misinterpreted Rogers.189 Specifically, the court erred in holding that
deferring to the tribes would reduce the Rogers test to one based solely
upon genetics and would undermine the purpose of the test, which,
according to the court, is to determine not only blood quantum but also a
defendant’s other ties to the given tribe.190 Nobles explained that “Indian
status under Rogers extends to ‘those who by the usages and customs of the
Indians are regarded as belonging to their race.’”191 From this, Rogers did
not require defendants to prove their own “ties” to a tribe, like the North
Carolina Court held; rather, Rogers merely requires that tribes “classify the
defendant as an Indian, based on whatever ‘usages and customs’ the tribes
themselves consider relevant.”192
2. The Court Should Decide Whether Indian Status Under the MCA Is a
Question for the Jury
The second question Nobles presented to the Court concerned whether
he was entitled to a special jury verdict regarding his Indian status.193 This
section of the writ petition began by asserting that the North Carolina
Supreme Court appeared to be the only court in the country to ever hold
that Indian status under the MCA was not a jury question.194 Nobles argued
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
Id.
Id. at 26 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1845)).
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id.
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that this conventional view of the issue was the correct one, considering
that both prongs of the Rogers test are indeed questions of fact.195
Nobles then contended that the North Carolina Supreme Court may have
been led astray because it considered this question only after deciding what
legal standard was most appropriate for determining Indian status.196 This
is likely why the lower court found that determining this status was an
inherently legal question for the judge alone.197 Nobles pointed out that
“factual questions decided by juries are always governed by legal
standards.”198 Nonetheless, “[t]hat does not make them questions of law.”199
Regardless of which legal approach the Court found appropriate for
determining Indian status, stated Nobles, all approaches hinge on factual
determinations to ultimately decide whether a defendant is or is not
recognized as an Indian.200 Therefore, the question is only suitable for a
jury.201
VI. Analysis
Although Nobles’ petition was denied, the jurisprudence on this issue
rightfully begged the Supreme Court to clarify the second prong of the
Rogers test and declare the appropriate approach for defining “Indian”
under the MCA. If this question is ever presented for review in the future,
the most effective solution would be to defer to the Tribe and ask if it
recognizes Nobles as an Indian. This approach is best for the purposes of
consistency, conservation of litigation time and resources, and, above all,
protection of tribal sovereignty.
A. Consistency Is Vital in Jurisdictional Determinations
Using either the four-factor or the multi-factor approaches to determine
tribal recognition under the Rogers test has created nothing close to a
consistent pattern.202 These approaches have created the possibility of a
195. Id. at 27.
196. Id. at 28.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 28–29.
201. Id.
202. See also Jacqueline F. Langland, Note, Indian Status Under the Major Crimes Act,
15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 109, 136–37 (2012) (detailing how factually similar these cases
were and their contradicting outcomes). Compare United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759
(8th Cir. 2009), with United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2009) (both courts
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person being Indian, for purposes of the MCA, in one court and not in
another. Using an approach that simplifies and gives a bright-line answer to
a jurisdictional question will promote a court’s consistency and
predictability.203 Courts should ask a respective tribe if it recognizes an
individual in a case as Indian rather than engage in countless findings of
fact.
Under this approach, an individual will satisfy the “tribal recognition”
prong of the Rogers test if the court plainly verifies with the claimed tribe
whether it recognizes that person as Indian for tribal purposes. Deferring to
the tribes will undeniably bring about the most consistent results, as many
tribes recognize certain non-members as Indians for purposes of criminal
jurisdiction and assistance extension.204 Following this approach, the
inquiry would stop there.
The majority of requests of tribal recognition will be easily accessible
from tribal entities if the Court adopts this approach. Most importantly,
these recognitions will be reliable and undeviating. The alternative,
nebulous multi-factor tests undeniably hold too much potential for
producing inconsistent outcomes, which is no way to declare or deny a
court’s power to hear a case. A person who is “Indian” in one jurisdiction,
therefore only triable in federal court, should be “Indian” in another to
preserve the dependability of the justice system.
B. The Alternative Approaches Waste Time and Resources
Not only will deferring to tribal recognition produce more consistent
results, but it will also preserve judicial time and resources. Following the
alternative approaches requires lengthy hearings, countless findings of fact,
and understanding the complex ins and outs of tribal government. Under a
non-tribal recognition approach, these efforts must be completed to declare
jurisdictional authority while the merits of the case wait idly by.

utilizing factor tests, having similar facts regarding Indian recognition, yet coming to
opposite conclusions on defendant’s Indian status).
203. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (“[C]ourts benefit from
straightforward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of their power to hear a
case. Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater predictability.”) (citations omitted).
204. For example, in Nobles’ case, Rule 6(b) of the Cherokee Rules of Criminal
Procedure extended the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction to first descendants. Writ Petition, supra
note 149, at 25; see CHER. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(b), Cherokee RCRP Rule 6 (Westlaw).
Additionally, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians held out certain tribal benefits to “first
descendants.” State v. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d 373, 376 (N.C. 2020). Thus, under this approach,
the EBCI clearly “recognized” Nobles—a first descendant—as an Indian.
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The time and resource consumption that comes with relying on multifactor tests is highly evident when looking at Nobles’ case. The Nobles trial
court took a deep and lengthy look into Nobles’ life to determine his Indian
status. At this pre-trial hearing, the court made itself aware, through
numerous witnesses and other offerings of evidence, of the following: all
benefits Nobles was entitled to as a first descendant of the EBCI; how
Nobles identified his race on various sentencing documents; his residence
history; how he identified himself regarding race to his probation officers;
the history of his attendance in the tribal school system; how his mother
identified his race on school enrollment forms; and his receipt of Indian
health services as a child.205 The hearing ultimately “contained hundreds of
detailed findings of fact.”206 This pre-trial determination would have been
dramatically reduced if the court had used the “deferral to tribes” method in
establishing tribal recognition. The inquiry would have been simplified to a
single question to the EBCI of whether it recognized Nobles as an Indian
for its own purposes. Deferring this determination to tribal entities will
eliminate the need for courts to delve into all of this factual information and
ultimately save parties time and money—resources that would then be
reserved for the main purpose of the litigation at bar.
C. Deferring to Tribes Best Upholds Tribal Sovereignty
When Congress enacted the MCA, it essentially assigned jurisdictional
power to the federal government for certain major crimes committed by
Indians within Indian Country.207 Although jurisdiction was undoubtedly
granted to the federal government by the MCA, it is worth asking if it also
gave courts the authority to decide who is “recognized” as an Indian in
those cases. Nobles makes valid legal arguments as to why leaving this
determination up to the tribes falls in line with the Court’s decision in
Rogers, the text of the MCA, and the purpose of the MCA.208 Arguably
more important, however, is the fact that letting federal and state courts
delve into what constitutes a person “recognized” as Indian considerably
chips away at tribal sovereignty.

205. Nobles, 838 S.E.2d at 376.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. 19 FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION § 46:1012 (Supp. 2021), FEDPROC §
46:1012 (Westlaw) (“Congress intended full implementation of federal criminal jurisdiction
in those situations to which the Major Crimes Act extends. When the Major Crimes Act
applies, jurisdiction is exclusively federal.”)
208. See Writ Petition, supra note 149, at 21–26.
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Certainly, if tribes have the absolute right to determine tribal
membership,209 they have the same right to define who they recognize as an
Indian (whether for purposes of criminal jurisdiction or for the extension of
benefits to certain non-members). It is inarguable that courts attempting to
determine correct jurisdiction over a person claiming Indian status under
the MCA have an interest in making sure that person meets the second
prong of the Rogers test and is indeed recognized as Indian by a tribal
entity. However, that recognition should be verified by the tribe itself, not
federal and state judges and juries. With the alternative approaches, judges
and juries in the United States are, in a very literal sense, deciding what
factors make a certain individual “Indian” enough to be recognized as such.
This declaration of recognition should be left to the tribe. There is no better
certification of recognition as an Indian than a tribe’s own determination.
Therefore, this is the approach the Supreme Court should adopt if, at some
point, it ever considers this issue.
VII. Conclusion
Nobles’ writ petition gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to clean up
the jurisdictional predicament that has been fostered by the lack of a brightline definition for “Indian” under the MCA. Hopefully, it will reconsider
reviewing this matter if another defendant was to raise the issue once more.
The legal silence around this subject has created three differing approaches
to determining the second prong of the Rogers test, meaning one person
may be considered Indian in one jurisdiction and not in another. The circuit
split has created critically inconsistent jurisdictional results across the
United States and rightfully warrants a clarifying answer from the Supreme
Court.
As Nobles argued in his petition, the Court, if is presented with the
opportunity again, should adopt the approach deferring the “tribal
recognition” determination to the respective tribe itself. This approach
allows for more consistency, considering most tribes regularly make this
determination already. It additionally allows for preservation of valuable
litigation time and resources; under this approach, a single inquiry will
suffice, in contrast to lengthy hearings for the determination. Most
importantly, this approach best safeguards tribal sovereignty by letting
tribal entities decide who they recognize as an Indian.
209. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (“A tribe's right to
define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its
existence as an independent political community.”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

386

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

This circuit split has long muddied the waters of federal and state
jurisdictional authority over Native American peoples. State v. Nobles
offered an overdue moment of clarity to be delivered by the Supreme Court
and should have been treated as such.
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